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CASE COMMENT
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFINES: DETERMINING THE
APPLICABILITY OF THE CITIZENSHIP CLAUSE TO
AMERICAN SAMOA
TUAUA v. UNITED STATES, NO. 12-01143, 2013 U.S. DIST.
LEXIS 89602 (D.D.C. JUNE 26, 2013)
Andrew Petrey*
I. FACTS
Plaintiffs, the Samoan Federation of America and a group of five
non-citizen U.S. nationals born in American Samoa, brought this case in
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia asserting that the
Fourteenth Amendment's Citizenship Clause extends to American
Samoa and that people born in American Samoa are therefore U.S.
citizens at birth.' Defendants, the United States and the related parties
that execute its citizenship laws, 2 moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' comglaint
for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The
court HELD that it did have subject-matter jurisdiction over the matters4
and granted Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim,
concluding that "[t]he Citizenship Clause does not guarantee birthright
citizenship to American Samoans." 5
II. HISTORY

"American Samoa is located on the eastern islands of an archipelago
in the South Pacific. The United States claimed [American Samoa] in a
1900 treaty with Great Britain and Germany and Samoan leaders
formally ceded sovereignty to the United States in 1900 and 1904.",6
American Samoa is classified as an "outlying possession" of the United
*

J.D. expected May 2014, University of Florida Levin College of Law; B.S. May
2011, Auburn University. This Comment is dedicated to the Wagner family for their continued
love and support.
1. Tuaua v. United States, No. 12-01143, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89602, at 1-2 (D.D.C.
June 26, 2013).
2. Id. at 2.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 9-12.
5. Id. at 14.
6. Id.
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States. 7 As such, people born in American Samoa are U.S. nationals but
not U.S. citizens at birth.8 "The State Department's Foreign Affairs
Manual ... categorizes American Samoa as an unincorporated territory
and states that 'the citizenship provisions of the [U.S.] Constitution do
not apply to persons born there.' 9 Plaintiffs allege a variety of harms
due to their non-citizen status.' 0 All of Plaintiffs' claims are based on
the same legal argument: "the Citizenship Clause applies to American
Samoa, so contrary law and policy must be invalidated.""
Under the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, "[a]ll
persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside."' 2 Thus, the question becomes whether the territory
qualifies as a part of the "United States" as used within the Citizenship
Clause.' 3
"The Supreme Court . . . addressed the extent to which the

Constitution applies in territories in a series of cases known as the
Insular Cases." In an oft-cited Insular Case, Downes v. Bidwell, the
Supreme Court decided whether territories of the United States were
subject to the protections of the U.S. Constitution.15 More specifically,
the Court was tasked with determining whether the Revenue Clause of
the U.S. Constitution applied to the newly acquired territory of Puerto
Rico.16 Downes, a merchant in New York, imported merchandise from
7.
8.
9.
10.

Id. at 6 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(29) (2013)).
Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1401(1) (2013)); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(29) (2013).
Tuaua, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89602, at 6. See also 8 U.S.C. § 1408(1) (2013).
Tuaua, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89602, at 7.
Plaintiffs allege a variety of harms that have befallen them due to their noncitizen national status. Several plaintiffs, despite long careers in the military or
law enforcement, remain unable to vote or to work in jobs that require
citizenship status. Other harms include: ineligibility for federal work-study
programs in college, ineligibility for firearm permits, and inability to obtain
travel and immigration visas.

Id. (citations omitted).
11. Id. at 2.
12. U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1.
13. Tuaua, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89602, at 15.
14. Id. at 15. The Insular Cases include: De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901); Goetze
v. United States, 182 U.S. 221 (1901); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901); Armstrong
v. United States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); Huus v. N.Y &
Porto Rico Steamship Co., 182 U.S. 392 (1901); Juan R. Torruella, One Hundred Years of
Solitude: Puerto Rico's American Century, in FOREIGN INA DOMESTIC SENSE: PUERTO RICO, THE
AMERICAN EXPANSION, AND THE CONSTITUTION, 248, 248 (Christina Duffy Burnett & Burke

Marshall eds., 2001).
15. Downes, 182 U.S. at 249.
16. Id.
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Puerto Rico.17 Downes was forced to pay an import tax on the
merchandise. He filed suit against the U.S. Customs Agent, alleging
that the Revenue Clause of the U.S. Constitution applied to Puerto Rico,
and thus taxes on imports from Puerto Rico should be in uniformity
with imports from other states.19 The Court held, "the Island of Puerto
Rico is a territory appurtenant and belonging to the United States, but
not a part of the United States within the [R]evenue [C]lauses of the
Constitution." 20 The Court also noted that Congress had continually
made special provisions for extending citizenship to newly acquired
territories.21 "[T]here is an implied denial of the rights of the inhabitants
to American citizenship until Congress by further action shall signify its
assent thereto."2 2
The Supreme Court affirmed the Insular Cases in Boumediene v.
Bush. 23 Boumediene carefully analyzed the Insular Cases, as well as a
number of subsequent cases, to help clarify the applicability of the U.S.
Constitution to unincorporated territories. 24 In Boumediene, foreign
nationals designated as enemy combatants were detained at the U.S.
Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.25 Separate courts determined
that each detainee was a member of the al Qaeda network.2 6 Each
detainee sought a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia, but the cases were dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction because the naval base was outside of sovereign territory. 27
The Supreme Court overturned the District Court's decision and held
that the detainees were entitled to the privilege of habeas corpus as
provided by the Suspension Clause of the U.S. Constitution even though
the detainees were not U.S. citizens. 28
In Eche v. Holder, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
addressed the question of whether the Naturalization Clause applied to
the "Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands" (CNMI) prior to

17. Id. at 247-48.
18. Id.; The Foraker act required the payment of "fifteen per centum of the duties which
are to be levied, collected and paid upon like articles of merchandise imported from foreign
countries." id at 247-48.
19. Id. at 248-49.
20. Id. at 287.
21. Id. at 280; Congress reserved the right to grant birthright citizenship to the people of
Louisiana, Florida, Alaska, Mexico, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines. id.
22. Id.
23. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 764 (U.S. 2008).
24. Id. at 755-62.
25. Id. at 732.
26. Id. at 734.
27. Id.; see also Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2002).
28. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 798.
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the enactment of a federal immigration law. 29 Plaintiff-Appellants, Eche
and Lo, became residents of CNMI before Congress enacted a statute
that made federal immigration laws applicable to CNMI. 30 In order to
apply for naturalization as U.S. citizens, lawful permanent residents of
the United States were required to show that they had resided in the
United States continuously for five years.3 1 Eche and Lo filed
applications to naturalize as U.S. citizens, but the applications were
denied because they had not fulfilled the five-year residency
requirement under the statute.32 Eche and Lo contended that their time
living in CNMI before the enactment of the immigration laws should
count towards the five-year period.3 3 The court disagreed, holding that
"[t]he Naturalization Clause does not apply of its own force and the
governments have not consented to its applicability." 34
In Rabang v. INS, seven individuals appealed "from the district
court's dismissal of their complaints for failure to state a claim for
relief." 5 Plaintiffs alleged that they were U.S. citizens under the
Citizenship Clause. 36 Plaintiffs claimed "that they or their parents were
born in the Philippines during its territorial period, [and] that during this
time the Philippine Islands were 'in the United States"' as used in the
Citizenship Clause. 37 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's
decision, holding that birth in the Philippines during its territorial period
did not give rise to U.S. citizenship. 3 8
III. INSTANT CASE

In the instant case, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia granted Defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim.39 The standard of review for a motion to dismiss is "whether the
plaintiff has pleaded facts sufficient to 'raise a right to relief above the
speculative level,' assuming that the facts alleged are true."40
First, the court concisely concluded that it had jurisdiction over
29. Eche v. Holder, 694 F.3d 1026, 1027 (9th Cir. 2012).
30. Id. at 1028.
31. Id. at 1027; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(1)(2013).
32. Eche, 694 F.3d at 1028.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1031.
35. Rabang v. INS, 35 F.3d 1449, 1450 (9th Cir. 1994).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1451.
38. Id. at 1452.
39. Tuaua v. United States, No. 12-01143, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89602, at *3 (D.D.C.
June 26, 2013).
40. Id. at *8 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
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Plaintiffs' claims. 4 1 Next, the court moved to the more tedious question
of whether Plaintiffs had pleaded facts sufficient to "raise a right to
relief above the speculative level." 4 2 The court concluded that Plaintiffs
failed to state a claim for relief.43 The court reached this conclusion
based upon "the Constitution's plain language, rulings from the
Supreme Court and other federal courts, longstanding historical
practice, and pragmatic considerations.""
The court based its decision largely on the Insular Cases, 4 5 especially
Downes,46 concluding that only certain "fundamental" constitutional
rights are extended to inhabitants of unincorporated territories. 47 The
court also noted that "[w]hile none of the Insular Cases directly
addressed the Citizenship Clause, they suggested that citizenship was
not a 'fundamental' right that applied to unincorporated territories."4 8
Downes, Justice Brown suggested that "citizenshi, and suffrage are not
'natural rights enforced in the Constitution."' 4 Justice Brown also
contrasted, in dicta, the language of the Citizenship Clause with the
language of other parts of the Constitution, stating that "there is a
limitation to persons born or naturalized in the United States, which is
not extended to persons born in any place 'subject to their

jurisdiction.",5o
In addition, the district court concluded that the past practice in other
unincorporated territories was to treat citizenship as a statutory right,
not a constitutional right.5 ' In both Eche and Rabang, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that citizenship was not afforded to unincorporated territories
because of the geographic limitations of the phrase "in the United
States" as used in the Citizenship Clause. 52 Furthermore, the court in the
instant case points out that Congress specifically enacted laws that
would provide a path to citizenship for the people of the Philippines and
the CNMI.53 The district court affirmed this view of the Citizenship
Clause, holding "[i]f the Citizenship Clause guaranteed birthright
41.

Id at *9-13.

42. Id. at *9-14 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
43. Id at *14.
44. Id.
45. See id. at *15.
46. See id. at 15-19 (citing Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 282 (1901)).
47. Id. at *16 (citing Doff v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 148-49); Balzac v. Porto Rico,
258 U.S. 298, 312 (1922); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 268 (1990)).
48. Id.
49. Id. at *17-18 (citing Downes, 182 U.S. at 282).
50. Id. at *18 (citing Downes, 182 U.S. at 251).
51. Id at *26.
52. See Rabang v. INS, 35 F.3d 1449, 1452 (9th Cir. 1994); Eche v. Holder, 694 F.3d
1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2012).
53. See Tuaua,2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89602, at *26-27.
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citizenship in unincorporated territories, these statutes would have been
unnecessary." 54

IV. ANALYSIS
Throughout the tortured history of cases exploring the applicability
of the U.S. Constitution to unincorporated territories, a bright-line rule
has never formed. The main rule that has emerged is that certain
fundamental rights apply to the territories.5 5 Unfortunately, little
guidance has been given regarding which rights are fundamental.
To date, the courts have determined that inhabitants of
unincorporated territories are entitled to Due ProceSS56 and the writ of
habeas corpus. 7 No case has specifically defined what all of the
fundamental rights are. The courts have been hesitant to expand the
applicability of the U.S. Constitution to unincorporated territories.58 in
contrast, courts have held that the Revenue Clause did not apply to
Puerto Rico, 59 the Citizenship Clause did not apply to the Philippines, 60
the Naturalization Clause did not apply to the Northern Mariana
Islands,' and that there was no right to a jury trial in the Philippines. 62
These decisions chip away at what could be considered fundamental.
In addition to the courts' decisions regarding whether certain rights
are fundamental or apply of their own force, many of the cases
including the instant case, look at the plain language of the U.S.
Constitution to show that the founders did not intend for citizenship to
be automatically extended to all territories over which the United States
exercises dominion. 63 Discrepancies in wording indicate that the
Citizenship Clause should be applicable to a limited class of people.
The wording of the Citizenship Clause limits its applicability to
"persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
54. Id. at *27.
55. See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 309, 312-13 (U.S. 1922). "The guaranties of
certain fundamental personal rights declared in the Constitution, as for instance that no person
could be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, had from the beginning
full application in the Philippines and Porto Rico .... Id. at 312-13.
56. See id. at 313.
57. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 798 (2008).
58. See Tuaua, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89602, at *27-28 ("While longstanding practice is
not sufficient to demonstrate constitutionality, such a practice requires special scrutiny before
being set aside").
59. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 287 (1901).
60. Rabang v. INS, 35 F.3d 1449, 1453-54 (9th Cir. 1994).
61. Eche v. Holder, 694 U.S. 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2012).
62. Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 149 (U.S. 1904).
63. See Tuaua, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89602, at *14-15; Downes, 182 U.S. at 251.
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jurisdiction thereof."64 However, the Equal Protection Clause applies to
"any person within its jurisdiction."65 Thus, it can be inferred that the
Citizenship Clause is extended to a more limited group than the Equal
Protection Clause.
Furthermore, the courts have treated territorial citizenship as a
statutory right, not a constitutional right.66 The district court in the
instant case states that the various statutes enacted by Congress to
confer citizenship to some of its territories would be unnecessary if
citizenship was guaranteed to inhabitants of unincorporated territories
by the Constitution. American Samoans will not have birthright
citizenship until that right is bestowed upon them by Congress.6 8
As a practical matter, it is interesting that the Court in the instant
case dismissed the case before reaching trial. 69 Despite the fact that the
courts have not directly answered the question presented, the court was
confident enough to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim,
concluding that even if it construed the facts in a manner most favorable
to Plaintiffs there was not sufficient information to suggest that there
was any recognized legal theory by which relief could be granted. 70 The
court's decision appears to be based upon all of the above information.
Perhaps any one of the reasons would not be sufficient to deny
citizenship to American Samoans, but taken together the court was
confident enough to dismiss the complaint.
V. CONCLUSION
The court's dismissal of the complaint likely will result in fewer
challenges to the applicability of the Citizenship Clause in
unincorporated territories. By dismissing the complaint for failure to
state a claim, the court held that even if all of the facts were tilted in the
Plaintiffs' favor there was still no right to relief.7 1 In the eyes of the
court, there was not even room for argument over whether the
Citizenship Clause applied to American Samoa. 72
64.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

65. Id.
66. Tuaua v. United States, No. 12-01143, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89602, at *26 (D.D.C.
June 26, 2013).
67. Id. at *27.
68. Id. at *27-28.
69. See id. at *28.
70. See id. at *8-14.
71. See id. at *14-28.
72. See id. at *23 ("In short, federal courts have held over and over again that
unincorporated territories are not included within the Citizenship Clause, and this Court sees no
reason to do otherwise!").
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The instant case demonstrates that U.S. citizenship is not a
fundamental right guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution to inhabitants of
unincorporated territories. 73 The instant case also demonstrates that the
provisions of the U.S. Constitution rarely apply of their own force. Even
though this was only a memorandum opinion, potential future
challengers will likely be hesitant to challenge this issue because of the
ease with which the court seemed to reach its conclusion. In light of this
case, inhabitants of unincorporated territories do not have birthright
citizenship until Congress has bestowed that privilege upon them. 74

73.
74.

See id. at *28.
See id. at *26-28.
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